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Abstract 
With the large expansion of Islamic finance in the recent years, sukuk, which are the Sharia-
compliant substitute to conventional bonds, are now becoming more prominent. The aim of 
this study is to examine the impact of sukuk issuance on firm performance. To do so, we 
analyze how stock market performance and operating performance are influenced by issuance 
of sukuk and bonds on a sample of Malaysian listed companies. We consider the short-term 
and medium-term stock market reaction through the computation of cumulative abnormal 
returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. We investigate the impact on operating 
performance by performing regressions and by calculating abnormal operating performance 
so that we can compare how issuance affects similar firms. We find that sukuk issuance 
generates a negative stock market reaction both in the short-term and in the medium-term. We 
also find evidence that issuing sukuk hampers operating performance. The analysis of 
abnormal operating performance shows that sukuk issuers have better performance than their 
matched bond issuers, but that sukuk contributes to reduce the gap in performance over time. 
Overall our results support the view that sukuk issuance hampers stock market performance, 
but that it is not attributable to a signaling effect on the bad financial situation of the issuer. 
We interpret our findings as evidence of adverse selection taking place on the financed 
projects and agency problems stemming from the specific sukuk structuring with stock market 
investors more reluctant to invest in sukuk issuers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There was an impressive development of Islamic financial activities in the world in the 
last decade, with worldwide Islamic financial assets rising from USD 150 billion in the mid-
1990s to USD 1.8 trillion by end of 2013.1 This trend has been driven by the growth of 
Islamic banking activities but also by the expansion of sukuk. By end of 2013 worldwide 
value of outstanding sukuk was USD 270 billion, representing 14.6% of global Islamic 
financial assets. 
What are sukuk? They are the alternative mode of financing to bonds that is compliant 
with the Islamic law (shari’a). Sukuk are investment certificates which can be issued by 
companies and countries, with similarities and differences with bonds. Like bonds, sukuk have 
a maturity date and provide income flows over the life of the security with a payment at 
maturity to their holders. Unlike bonds, the value of sukuk is not based on the 
creditworthiness of the issuer, as holding sukuk shares represents the ownership in tangible 
assets, usufruct, or services of revenue-generating issuers. As a consequence, sukuk prices can 
vary both with the creditworthiness of the issuer and with the market value of the underlying 
asset. 
Sukuk can be structured like debt-based instruments or partnership contracts. Debt-
based instruments such as Ijara (rental/lease agreement) and Murabaha (cost-plus sale) do not 
contain stricto sensu interest but they pay a predetermined rate of return to investors. 
Musharaka and Mudaraba are partnership contracts in which the financier and the 
entrepreneur share profits based on pre-agreed ratios whereas losses are commensurate to 
their contribution to the partnership. 
Given the expansion of sukuk, it appears as a surprise that research remains scarce on 
this issue. Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill (2013) use an event study methodology to 
compare the stock market reaction to the announcements of sukuk and bond issues of 
companies in Malaysia. They find that the stock market reaction is neutral to the 
announcement of bonds but that investors react negatively to the announcement of sukuk. The 
negative implications of sukuk issues are attributed to two reasons. First, an adverse selection 
mechanism can be at work, as borrowers with the lowest return expectations may favor the 
issuance of profit-and-loss sharing sukuk structures over conventional interest-based bonds. 
Second, there is an excessive demand for sukuk coming from Islamic institutions. As a result, 
                                                 
1 All figures on Islamic finance activities come from  Kuwait Finance House (2014) 
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it can be easier for a firm to issue and sell sukuk relative to bonds. Issuing sukuk would then 
be interpreted as a way to obtain financing when the company is unable to issue a bond. 
Godlewski, Turk-Ariss, and Weill (2016) prolong this work by examining the impact of 
two key features of sukuk on the stock market reaction: the type of sukuk, and the certification 
by shari’a scholars. Sukuk must be certified by these scholars to guarantee their compliance 
with shari’a. By performing the analysis on a sample of eight countries, they find that debt-
like sukuk favor a positive stock market relation in comparison to partnership contracts. This 
result is observed in particular for Ijara sukuk, the most commonly used sukuk structure. They 
explain this finding by the lower shari’a compliance risk of Ijara compared to other structures 
but also by the adverse selection mechanism that hampers the issuance of profit-and-loss 
sharing sukuk. They also show that the choice of scholars can influence the stock market 
reaction to sukuk issuance. 
Our objective is to extend these works by providing a broader analysis of the impact of 
sukuk issuance on the performance of the issuing firm. Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill 
(2013) have analyzed the stock market reaction to sukuk issuance but they restrict their study 
to the short-term stock market performance. We can however wonder if issuing sukuk exerts 
an influence on medium-term stock market performance and on operating performance. The 
analysis of the medium-term stock-market reaction is of use to check if the negative stock 
market reaction persists over time. 
By examining operating performance, we have a better view of all consequences of the 
issuance of sukuk for a firm. In line with the theoretical arguments on the influence of debt 
issuance on firm performance, we can check if sukuk issuance exerts a similar impact than 
bond issuance. The study of operating performance helps also understanding the reasons of 
the negative stock market reaction following sukuk issuance. Namely the negative stock 
market reaction to sukuk issuance suggests that stock market investors consider this event as 
bad news for the evolution of the firm performance. To issue sukuk would act as a signal of 
the bad financial shape of the issuer, in line with the adverse selection argument stressed 
before. Alternatively, it can also contribute to deteriorate the situation of the firm if such event 
is more costly than the issuance of a bond. 
To answer these questions, we perform for the first time a broad analysis of the impact 
of sukuk issuance on firm performance. We consider a sample of 114 Malaysian listed 
companies that issued 164 sukuk (47 issuers) and 604 bonds (67 issuers) from 2002 to 2010. 
Our focus is on Malaysia, as this country is by far the world’s biggest country of issuance for 
corporate sukuk. In addition, the volume of issued corporate bonds is substantial and allows a 
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comparison between the issuance of corporate sukuk and bonds. The focus on the Malaysian 
market also allows avoiding the influence of tax rules between sukuk and bonds, as taxation 
rules for sukuk in Malaysia aim at guaranteeing the fiscal neutrality between both types of 
instruments.2Understanding how sukuk issuance influences firm performance has major 
interest for the analysis of sukuk markets. It contributes to explain the stock market reaction 
by analyzing how the operating performance of the firm evolves after the issuance. Namely, 
stock market performance is supposed to be influenced, notably, by the expected evolution of 
operating performance. So by looking simultaneously at the stock market and the operating 
performances, we bring a comprehensive view of the investor perception. It also provides 
some perspectives on the evolution of sukuk markets, as investor valuation and influence on 
operating performance can affect the decisions of firms to issue sukuk. 
Our empirical analysis is composed of four parts. First, we analyze the stock market 
reaction to sukuk and bond issuance to provide evidence on the stock market performance in 
the short-term. It is a first step in our analysis to check if the result from Godlewski, Turk-
Ariss and Weill (2013) stands for our sample before examining how sukuk issuance influences 
operating performance and medium-term stock performance. Second, we calculate abnormal 
operating performance to study how issuance can affect operating performance of similar 
firms. We create pairs of similar firms with one sukuk issuer and one bond issuer. We can 
then examine if a sukuk issuer performs better than its matched bond issuer. Third, we 
examine how sukuk and bond issuance influences operating performance and thus may 
explain the first reaction of stock market investors. To do so, we perform regressions of 
operating performance indicators. We are then able to investigate if issuing sukuk leads to a 
deterioration of operating performance. In other words, we can check if the negative stock 
market reaction can be explained by the expectation that this event hampers the financial 
situation of the firm. Fourth, we examine medium-term stock market reaction to sukuk 
issuance. We then compute the buy-and-hold abnormal return to study the stock market 
reaction in the three years following the issuance. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents theory and testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 
provides the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 See for additional information the website of Securities Commission Malaysia: http://www.sc.com.my/general-
section/special-incentives/islamic-capital-market/ and http://www.sc.com.my/general-section/special-incentives/bond-
market/. 
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2. Theory and testable hypotheses 
 
In this section, we explain why firm performance is differently influenced by sukuk or 
bond issuance. To this aim, we first develop the arguments why debt issuance should 
influence firm performance. Then we explain how these arguments can act in a different way 
following sukuk issuance in comparison to bond issuance. 
 
2.1 Debt issuance and firm performance 
 
Theoretical literature provides opposing arguments on the impact of debt issue on firm 
performance. Two hypotheses may explain a positive impact on firm performance. First, 
issuing debt is a signal solving adverse selection issues. Namely, information asymmetries 
between firm insiders and outsiders create an adverse selection issue. High-quality firms have 
then incentives to send a signal to show their quality. Debt represents a credible signal. 
Issuing a debt is more costly for firm’s insiders in a low-quality firm than in a high-quality 
firm, due to the probability of default in case of bad performances (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Ross, 1977). Shareholders are then expected to react positively to a bond issue which reveals 
promising prospects for the firm’s profitability. 
Second, issuing debt contributes to reduce agency costs created by conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers. The separation of ownership and management creates 
diverging objectives between shareholders and managers, and as such contributes to favor 
moral hazard behavior of managers tempted to take actions that benefit themselves at the 
expense of firm value. This behavior can take place through waste of firm resources or 
through minimization of effort. In any case, it contributes to deteriorate firm value. However 
debt financing disciplines managers. It reduces the “free cash-flow” at the disposal of 
managers (Jensen, 1986): debt implies interest payment obligations that must be satisfied by 
firm managers as not satisfying firm obligations would lead to bankruptcy of the firm. It also 
strengthens the incentives of managers to perform well since they face personal costs in case 
of firm bankruptcy (Grossman and Hart, 1982). Hence the disciplining role of debt should 
favor positive stock market reaction and operating performance. 
Two hypotheses can also be proposed to predict a negative influence of debt issuance on 
firm performance. On the one hand, issuing debt enhances agency costs created by conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and debtholders. Shareholders have incentives to act in their 
interests at the expense of debtholders. This divergence of interests can appear through 
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different forms. Shareholders can favor investment in riskier projects than those preferred by 
debtholders, with such “asset substitution” caused by the asymmetry of gains for shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
On the other hand, debt issuance increases the probability of bankruptcy for the issuing 
firm. A greater leverage enhances the risk that a firm will not be able to meet its 
commitments. As such, debt issuance raises the likelihood of this event which represents 
losses for shareholders. But without going to the extreme situation of bankruptcy, greater 
leverage also enhances the probability of financial distress and then the costs associated with 
this situation. 
 
2.2 Sukuk vs. bond issuance and firm performance: testable hypotheses 
 
The above arguments explain how debt issuance can influence firm performance. We 
now present the main reasons why sukuk issuance can exert a different impact on firm 
performance than bond issuance. These reasons are related to the formerly presented 
arguments and to the features of sukuk. 
Differences in structuring between sukuk and bonds can influence the expectations of 
stock market investors. Sukuk are vehicles for which the income given to holders is not 
generated by the issuing firm but by the asset on which sukuk is backed. Then the firm does 
not have interest repayment obligations and the rights of sukuk holders differ from those of 
creditors. 
However, in the large majority of cases sukuk flows are paid by the issuer itself. For 
instance, for Ijara sukuk (rental / lease agreement), rental payments are often paid by the 
issuer through a sale and lease-back (El-Gamal, 2006). Similarly, for Murabaha sukuk (cost-
plus sales), the issuer provides an income to the holders of the vehicle. In addition, the 
majority of sukuk includes ex-ante defined rates of return. 
Once these elements on sukuk practice are given, we can gather the motives for a 
differentiated impact of sukuk issue on firm performance in three broad arguments. 
First, sukuk can contribute to solve information asymmetries in a different way than 
bonds. A key principle of Islamic finance is profit and loss sharing. As a consequence, Islamic 
financial products are particularly sensitive to adverse selection and moral hazard behavior of 
borrowers. However all forms of sukuk do not follow this ethical principle. Mudaraba and 
Musharaka are partnership contracts which are fully compliant with profit and loss sharing 
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principle. Nonetheless the majority of sukuk are based on debt-like forms, with the use of 
Ijara and to a lesser degree Murabaha. 
However adverse selection is a major concern for partnership contracts. Profits and 
losses generated by the project are shared between investors. This type of financial 
instruments has advantages for firms in bad shape. Such firms have incentives to finance a 
very risky project with this type of contract. Symmetrically, good issuers have incentives to 
choose conventional financial contracts so that they can keep a greater share of generated 
profits. 
Hence sukuk issuers can be low-quality firms. As a consequence, the issuance of sukuk 
would not help solving adverse selection. In other words, we should observe a negative stock 
market reaction to sukuk issue relative to bond issue, and also to a negative influence of sukuk 
issue on the operating performance of the issuer. 
The negative market response to sukuk issue can even be strengthened by the 
oversubscription of sukuk. As stressed by Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill (2013), we 
observe an excess demand for sukuk because of the coexistence of a strong demand from 
Islamic banks looking for liquid Sharia-compliant assets and of a limited supply of these 
instruments.  
Second, sukuk issuance can generate different costs than bond issuance of two kinds. On 
the one hand, the costs of financial distress can differ between both types of issuance. These 
costs increase with debt issuance and as such contribute to a negative impact on firm 
performance. In theory, sukuk holders own the underlying asset. However practice shows that 
these rights can become uncertain in case of financial difficulties for the company, as pointed 
out by van Wijnbergen and Zaheer (2013) in recent cases. Sukuk makes more complex the 
rights of all investors during the liquidation of the company. As a consequence, costs of 
financial distress can be greater for sukuk issuers than for bond issuers. 
On the other hand, to issue sukuk can be more costly than a bond issuance. Sukuk 
structuring requires several additional operations in comparison to the issuance of bonds. A 
special purpose vehicle has to be established, which has to be managed. All in all, Storck and 
Cekici (2011) have counted between twenty and thirty contractual documents for the issuance 
of sukuk. Each document needs also the compliance with the law of the country but also with 
shari’a, which creates greater legal costs for sukuk relative to bonds, even if financial 
differences between both types of securities are minor. 
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Both sets of arguments related to different costs for issuances are then in favor of a 
more negative stock market reaction following sukuk issuance than bond issuance in the short-
term but also in the medium-term. 
Third, the disciplining role of debt can differ when a firm decides to issue sukuk or 
bond. Some arguments support the view that the disciplining role of debt would be lower 
when sukuk is issued. On the one hand, sukuk is based on the establishment of a special 
purpose vehicle, which is legally independent of the issuer and does not mean tight return 
obligations as these returns are generated by the assets on which sukuk is backed. On the other 
hand, profit and loss sharing principle means that managers do not have obligations to pay 
interest payments not related to the returns of the company, and that they do not face the same 
personal costs in case of bankruptcy, given that sharing profits and losses means to risk of 
bankruptcy. 
Thus managers should be less disciplined by debt when sukuk are issued, which would 
favor their moral hazard behavior at the expense of shareholders. As a consequence, firms 
using sukuk should choose investment projects with lower returns, leading to reduced 
profitability of sukuk issuers. We should also observe sukuk-issuing firms accumulating 
greater free cash flows. Then the reduction of the disciplining role of debt with sukuk issue 
could have a negative influence on the stock market and the operating performances of firms. 
 
We have presented the reasons why sukuk issuance can have a different influence on the 
performance of the issuing firm than bond issuance. They motivate the five following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: the stock market reaction is more negative following sukuk issuance  
than following bond issuance. 
Hypothesis 2: sukuk issuance has a negative impact on the operating performance of 
issuing firms. 
Hypothesis 3: sukuk-issuing firms have worse operating performance than bond-
issuing firms. 
Hypothesis 4: sukuk issuance leads to retention of free cash flows by the issuer. 
Hypothesis 5: medium-term abnormal returns of sukuk issuers are lower than those of 
bond issuers. 
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3. Data 
 
We use data covering sukuk and bond issuances in Malaysia from 2002 to 2010, while 
accounting and stock data span from 2001 to end 2013. Data are extracted from the 
Bloomberg Professional Terminal Server (Bloomberg). The sample gathers 164 sukuk 
issuances and 645 bond issuances taking place between the 1st of January 2002 and the 31st of 
December 2010. By taking into account all maturities for securities on Malaysia debt market 
(sukuk and bonds), we extend the sample in comparison to Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill 
(2013, 2016).The distribution of issues by industry and by year is displayed in Table 1. Table 
2 displays descriptive statistics on our sample of securities classified by issue type. We can 
point out that bonds are on average larger than sukuk, and are associated with a longer 
maturity. A larger size for bond issues can be partly due to the fact that sukuk issues decrease 
in recent years whereas bond issues increase. It mechanically leads to a higher nominal value 
for bonds. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics by issuer. The table reports the statistics by 
considering the year preceding the issue.  
We have considered a period of five years for each issue, with the year preceding the 
issue, the issuance year and the three following years. To prevent any overlapping issue, the 
sample encompasses only issuers that issued only bonds or sukuk over the whole period of 
study. We have then a sample of 114 single issuers including 47 sukuk issuers and 67 bond 
issuers. Several striking facts emerge from the comparison of both types of issuers. First, 
sukuk issuers appear to have a smaller median size measured by their sales and to issue 
smaller amount than bond issuers. Second sukuk issuers have a higher market capitalization 
normalized to assets and a greater current ratio. Third, profitability is better for sukuk issuers. 
They have greater Ebitda to total assets (median) and ROA. Fourth, sukuk issuers display 
significantly lower free cash-flows. In a nutshell, the analysis of the firms issuing sukuk and 
bond shows that sukuk issuers do not have a worse financial situation for the year preceding 
the issue but rather tend to be in better financial shape. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
We perform four analyses to provide a broad view of how sukuk issue can influence 
the performance of the issuing firm.  
First, we study the reaction of stock market investors following the issuing of a sukuk 
or a bond. In this aim, we compute the average abnormal return of the company in the days 
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surrounding the event. Our methodology to compute the abnormal return is standard in the 
literature (MacKinlay, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 2006). We estimate a market model. We 
use an estimation period of 90 working days from -11 to -100 days before the issuance. The 
daily abnormal return (AR) is then calculated as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? +  𝛽?̂?. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)     (1) 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the arithmetic stock return of the company i on the date t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the 
arithmetic stock market return on t. The return is figured out from the stock closing price, 
each working day. We use the MSCI Malaysia Index, which aggregates the performance of 
middle and large capitalizations on the Malaysian stock market and includes 85% of public 
companies in Malaysia.3 In order to capture all potential reactions of shareholders, we 
compute three different windows. First, we consider solely the event day, i.e. t=0, to gradually 
enlarge the observation window to one day, then two days, before and after the event ([-1,1] 
and [-2,2]). The reason to study the impact of the event before the issue date is to include a 
potential leakage of the information toward the shareholders before the official 
announcement. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each company i is computed as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝜏,𝑇) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏         (2) 
with τ the first day of the corresponding observation window and T the last day. For 
univariate studies, we calculate the arithmetic mean of the 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝜏,𝑇) for the N firms of the 
sample. To prevent any overlapping of the data, issues taking place within ten days of interval 
have been removed from the sample. 
We complete the analysis of the short-term market reaction by performing regressions 
of the CAR. The explained variable is the CAR, while the key explanatory variable is the 
dummy variable Sukuk that is equal to one if the issue is a sukuk and zero otherwise. Several 
control variables are included into the regressions. To control for issuance’s characteristics we 
use issuance’s maturity, amount and coupon. We then use variables for firm characteristics: 
logarithm of sales, market capitalization (total capitalization to total assets), debt ratio (total 
debt to total assets), current ratio and the Altman Z-score (as provided by Bloomberg). We 
also include dummy variables for industry and year of issuance. Standard deviations are 
clustered at the issuer level. 
Second, we calculate the abnormal operating performance (AOP). This technique is 
based on pair-comparisons and is commonly used in the literature on the impact of an event 
                                                 
3 For robustness check, we also use four alternative indices: the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index (the 30 first Malaysian 
capitalizations), the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 (100 first capitalizations), the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Emas Index (98% of 
Malaysian capitalizations) and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Emas Sharia Index (which encompasses only the companies in line 
with Islamic finance requirements). We obtain similar findings. 
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on operating performance.4 The reasoning is to match firms according to common features the 
year preceding the issue and then to compare both the difference of operating performance 
and its evolution the years following the issue. We consider two variables for profitability. 
First, we use the Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation scaled by total assets 
(Ebitda). This variable provides an indicator of operational performance before taking into 
account amortization policy and extraordinary performance and the influence of financial 
expenses. It then allows analyzing the impact on firm performance of bond or sukuk without 
being influenced by the potential difference in financial costs between both types of 
instruments. Second, we use the Return on Assets (ROA) to have an overall view of the firm 
performance, following the recommendations of Barber and Lyon (1996).  
To test the free cash-flow hypothesis, we use the free cash-flows to the firm scaled by 
total assets (FCF). The issuers are matched in order to create homogenous couples, composed 
of one firm which issued a sukuk and one which issued a bond. Following Eberhart, Maxwell 
and Siddique (2004), the firms should be in the same industry and issue the debt security the 
same year. Then, it should be the closest firm in terms of size (measured by total assets) the 
year preceding the issuance in the sample (Nohel and Tarhan, 1998). Last, the couple is 
matched according to Ebitda the year preceding the issuance, since this indicator of 
performance is not polluted by past financial performances. For each criterion, the matching is 
carried out by minimizing the squared difference of the variable between both groups of firms 
(sukuk or bond issuers).  
When the pairs are formed, the abnormal operating performance (AOP) of a sukuk 
issuer is the difference between its performance and its expected performance, i.e. the 
performance of its matched firm (who issued a bond). To capture growth dynamics, we follow 
Barber and Lyon (1996) who advocate to use the difference of the variation of performance. 
In this case, the expected operating performance (OP) of the firm i the year y becomes :
 𝐸(𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑦) =  𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑦−1 +   (𝑂𝑃𝑗,𝑦 −  𝑂𝑃𝑗,𝑦−1 ) = 𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑦−1 +  ∆𝑂𝑃𝑗,𝑦  (3) 
with j the matched firm (who issued a bond). 
 We generate a cumulative abnormal operating performance (CAOP) depending on the 
number of years following the event we were screening, namely up to three years. We 
compute both the mean and the median of AOP. This choice is motivated by the common 
observation in the literature that the median is more appropriate than the mean for the results 
                                                 
4 See among others Barber and Lyon (1996), Lie (2001), Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004), Williams and Tang (2009) 
and Lemmon et al. (2014).  
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given the dissymmetry of the distribution of performance indicators (Barber and Lyon, 1996; 
Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique, 2004; Lie, 2001).  
Third, we analyze how issuance of sukuk and bonds can influence the operating 
performance of issuing firms. To do so, we perform panel regressions with random effects of 
the three operating performance indicators: Ebitda, ROA, and FCF. We cluster standard 
deviations at the issuer level. To study all the potential effects of the type of issue on the firm, 
we use all these variables from one to three years after the issue. As stressed by Williams and 
Tang (2009), the effects of an event may take some time to occur. To examine potential 
variation effects, we also compute the cumulative variations of these indicators during the 
three years following the event.5 Thus we use accounting data spanning from 2001 (one year 
before issues for 2002) to 2013 (three years after issues for 2010). The key independent 
variable is Sukuk defined as a dummy variable equal to one in the case of a sukuk issuer and 
zero otherwise. We use the same set of control variables at the firm level than for explaining 
the CAR. We also add the total amount issued by the firm and the mean maturity for the 
corresponding year. Last, we include dummies to control for the sectors and years. 
Fourth, we examine the medium-term abnormal stock returns of firms. We investigate 
if the immediate reaction of stock market investors is persistent over time, but also if the 
medium-term stock market performance of firms is consistent with their operating 
performance. We compute the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) following the 
methodology of Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). It was used by Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-
Hussin (2010), Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) and How et al. (2007) among others. 
The BHAR can be defined as the difference between the realized and expected buy-and-hold 
benchmark. The BHAR of a firm i on the period (τ,T) is defined as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝜏,𝑇) =  [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − 1
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏 ] − [∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡)) − 1
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏 ]   (4) 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the arithmetic return of the firm i on the date t and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =  𝑅𝑚,𝑡, i.e. 
the arithmetic return of the market portfolio on the date t. The same indices than those 
adopted for computing CAR have been used to proxy the market portfolio. We define three 
observation periods (τ,T): (0,252), (0,504) and (0,756), namely one, two and three years in 
working days after the announcement date. We compute these returns relative to the MSCI 
Malaysia Index. Again, for the univariate analysis, we calculated the arithmetic mean of the 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝜏,𝑇) for the N firms of the sample. As for CAR, we perform regressions of BHAR 
with clustered standard errors at the issuer level to provide multivariate results.  
                                                 
5 For instance, the cumulative variation of the ROA of the firm i is generated as ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 =  ∑ (
3
𝑦=0 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑦 − 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑦−1), with 
y = 0 the year of the issue. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Short-term stock market reaction 
 
We begin the analysis by examining the stock market reaction to sukuk and bond 
issuance announcement. Table 4 displays the mean and median CAR by type of security issue 
(sukuk or bond). The analysis of the results for the full sample shows that the mean and 
median CARs of sukuk issues are significantly negative for all event windows, with the 
exception of the event window [0,0] for which the mean CAR is negative but not significant. 
In the case of bond issues, the mean CAR is not significant or significantly positive depending 
on the event window. These first results tend to suggest a more detrimental market response 
for sukuk issues than for bond issues which accords with evidence from Godlewski, Turk-
Ariss and Weill (2013). 
We then check if the stock market reaction is significantly different for a sukuk issue 
and a bond issue. The difference is always negative for all event windows and significantly 
negative for the event windows [-1,1] Hence these results tend to show that the stock market 
investors react differently to the type of issue. 
To gain further insight, we examine if the stock market reaction to sukuk and bond 
issues is influenced by the period of study. Namely, our period includes the financial crisis as 
it goes from 2002 to 2010. We define the crisis period as year 2008 and 2009 in line with the 
fall of Malaysian GDP during both years. The results are displayed by splitting the full sample 
between both periods. We find a major difference between both periods. Before the crisis we 
find again that the difference is significantly negative between sukuk and bond issues in most 
cases. However during the crisis, we cannot conclude to a different perception of investors of 
both types of issues. Even if the difference is negative, it is not significant in all cases.  
Thus our findings support the view that stock market investors have a different 
perception of sukuk and bond issues. Investors appear to be reluctant to invest in sukuk issuers 
in favor of firms opting for bond. Thus, a sukuk issuance consists in a particularly bad signal 
for investors. 
We complete the analysis of the market response to sukuk and bond announcements by 
performing regressions of the CAR. The explained variables are the CAR[-1,1] and the CAR[-
2,2], while the key explanatory variable is the dummy variable Sukuk that is equal to one if the 
issue is a sukuk and zero otherwise.  
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The results are presented in Table 5. When the full period is considered, Sukuk is 
negative and significant for both windows. So we can conclude to a different perception of 
stock market investors to sukuk and bond issues even once issuer and issue characteristics are 
controlled. 
The results by distinguishing before and during the crisis do not provide any new 
insight. Sukuk is negative but not significant when dividing the sample between the issuance 
occurring during and outside the crisis. Stock market investors do not appear to react 
differently within or outside the financial crisis.6 
Thus, the main conclusion of the analysis of the short-term reaction of stock markets is 
that sukuk issues lead to a negative reaction significantly different than bond. This conclusion 
is broadly supportive of the results reported by Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill (2013) who 
find that the stock market reaction to sukuk issues can be negative. We then provide support to 
Hypothesis 1 according to which the stock market has a more negative reaction to sukuk 
issues than to bond issues.  
 
5.2 Abnormal operating performance 
 
We investigate how issuance of a sukuk or a bond can influence operating 
performance of comparable firms by computing abnormal operating performance (AOP) 
measures. We create homogenous pairs by matching sukuk and bond issuing firms one by 
one. 
We have to remind that the use of AOP provides very different insights than the 
regressions of operating performance indicators when it comes to examine the impact of 
sukuk issuance. Regressions provide information on the impact after t years of sukuk issuance 
on operating performance. With AOP, we are able to analyze the difference in the joint 
evolution of two firms, with one issuing sukuk and the other issuing bond, with similar 
characteristics over the years. AOP then informs on the evolution over time of the operating 
performance of a sukuk issuer relative to similar firms and not only on the impact of sukuk 
issuance on operating performance. We can have a sukuk issuer performing better than its 
matched bond issuer, while at the same time we do not observe a positive link between sukuk 
issuance and operating performance, as regressions do not match similar firms. 
                                                 
6 We use a more conservative definition of outside financial crisis by removing the issues which occurred after 
the crisis (i.e. in 2010). It does not change the results. 
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Table 6 displays the results for the mean and median cumulative abnormal operating 
performance (CAOP) for the three years following the issue. The results are in percentage 
points for the difference with the matched firm, with a positive figure meaning a better 
performance of the sukuk-issuing firm. We use the Student test of mean and the non-
parametric Wilcoxon test of median to check the significance of the difference. Two 
noteworthy results emerge. 
First, we find support for a better performance of sukuk issuers relative to their 
matched firms. When considering AOP for one year to three years, we observe significantly 
better performance for sukuk issuers with ROA However, sukuk do not outperform bond 
issuers on operating performance with a non-significant difference in Ebitda. Second, we 
observe that sukuk issuers tend to have slightly higher (median) free cash flows than bond 
issuers. 
Thus the main conclusion emerging from these results is the overall better operating 
performance for sukuk issuers than for firms issuing bonds. Moreover sukuk issuers appear to 
retain slightly more free cash flows. 
 
Our results are based on the standard expectancy. However this computation mode is 
associated with inertia and does not allow detecting a slowdown in performance. A firm 
outperforming others can then be interpreted or considered as keeping or increasing the gap in 
performance. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), we consider next the difference of the 
variation in performance to take this issue into account. 
We present also these results in Table 6. The main finding is the incremental reduction 
of the median difference for the variation in Ebitda and ROA during the second and third 
years following the issue. If sukuk issuers perform better than bond issuers, the difference in 
operating performance gradually decreases over time. Sukuk seems to act as if it slows down 
growth of Ebitda and ROA. On the contrary, the FCF increases during the second year, 
underlying once more some retention issues.  
We can then provide a first explanation of the negative stock market reaction 
following sukuk issuance. Investors react negatively to the expected slowdown of 
performance resulting from the use of sukuk by firms, while the better performance of these 
firms issuing sukuk has already been reflected in their stock prices. 
Our findings on AOP may also be influenced by the period of study. Namely the 
financial crisis can have influenced the impact of sukuk issuance on operating performance. 
As a consequence, we examine if the findings on AOP stand for both periods before and 
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during the crisis. We then compare the mean and median results for both periods. We define 
sukuk issuance to take place during the crisis if the issuance takes place in 2008 or 2009 
again. 
Our first finding of a better performance (ROA) of sukuk issuers relative to their 
matched firms is observed outside the crisis and during the crisis. As for the full sample, 
Ebitda proves to be non-significant. Our second finding is higher free cash flows for sukuk 
issuers the third year during the crisis. As for the full sample, we find no significant difference 
before the crisis. 
We also compare the results for the variation in performance before and during the 
crisis to check if the dynamics of these indicators has changed between both periods. The 
main finding over the period was the incremental reduction of the median difference for the 
variation in ROA during the three years following the issue. We find evidence in favor of this 
result for the years outside the crisis. The positive gap in ROA for sukuk issuers is gradually 
reduced over time and the Ebitda is reducing too. However, during the crisis, the gap of the 
Ebitda is increasing, even if it eventually does not lead to a higher variation of ROA. Last, the 
gap of free cash-flows is widening outside the financial crisis.  
All in all, our main findings on AOP, i.e. outperforming sukuk issuers are not 
influenced by the period of the study. They seem rather consistent over time and are not 
strongly affected by the financial crisis. On the other hand, the variation of the gaps is mainly 
driven by years outside the crisis period. 
These findings do not contradict the observation of a better performance for sukuk 
issuers. They only show that this gap in performance is reduced over time following the 
issuance. This event seems to act as an obstacle for issuers to increase their performance.  
The better performance we observe for sukuk issuers should not be overinterpreted. 
The computation of abnormal returns does not show better performance caused by sukuk 
issuance. The advantage in performance appears to exist before the issuance. Indeed, sukuk 
issuers present a higher ROA the year preceding the issuance and a higher Ebitda the year of 
the issuance. However the reduction of this gap in performance only occurs the years further 
to the issuance underlying a potential effect of sukuk issuance on the firm. 
The fact that we observe a better operating performance for sukuk issuers is a finding 
of particular interest. As highlighted by Kuran (2004) and Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill 
(2013), sukuk issuers could be less-healthy firms which prefer sukuk in the form of profit-and-
loss sharing financing schemes over bond. The argument is that companies with low profit 
expectations do not opt for bonds with fixed repayments. Our evidence rejects the hypothesis 
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that firms in poor financial situation tend to prefer sukuk. Firms opting for sukuk are not the 
ones with worse financial condition. We even tend to find that they are in better financial 
situation than those opting for bonds when we compute AOP. 
However the choice to issue sukuk contributes to deteriorate their short-term stock 
market performance and even their operating performance. We can then question the reasons 
of this choice, as they would have incentives to opt for bonds so that they can signal their 
better quality. We attribute this behavior to an adverse selection mechanism taking place on 
the projects and not on the issuing firms. Namely, firms with low-return project have 
incentives to opt for sukuk to finance this project because of the profit and loss sharing 
principle. As such, the use of sukuk would deteriorate the operating performance of the issuer. 
From the stock market perspective, the expectation that issuing sukuk will contribute to 
reduce operating performance leads to a negative stock market reaction. 
Hence we reject Hypothesis 3 according to which sukuk-issuing firms have better 
operating performance than those opting for bonds. However, we support Hypothesis 4 that 
issuing sukuk would lead to retention of free cash flows by the issuers. 
 
5.3 Operating performance 
 
We have shown that stock market investors react differently to the announcements of 
sukuk and bond issues. To determine the interpretations of this finding, we investigate the 
impact of issuances of sukuk and bonds on operating performance of firms. We want to 
analyze if the stock market reaction is motivated by the expected impact of security issue on 
operating performance of the issuing firm. To this end, we perform regressions of operating 
performance measures. We consider the operating performance of the issuer 1, 2, or 3 years 
after the issue. We also examine the variation of the three indicators of operating performance 
between the year of issuance and three years later. We report the results of the estimations in 
Table 7 for performance indicators and Table 8 for free cash-flows.  
Our main finding is that sukuk issuance tends to hamper operating performance. Sukuk 
coefficient has a negative and significant impact on ROA the third year following the 
issuance. We dig deeper this question by considering separately the periods before and during 
the crisis. We aim to check if the impact of sukuk issuance on operating performance differs 
with the period. We observe that the result of a significant and negative influence of Sukuk 
when explaining ROA only stands for the period outside the financial crisis. During the crisis, 
the effect proves to be non-significant. 
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To compare sukuk impact on performance with bonds’ impacts, we also include in the 
panel regression a dummy for bond issuers and calculate the difference in coefficients. Bond 
issuance does not hamper operating performance. Moreover the difference in the impact of 
sukuk and bond on Ebitda is significantly negative for sukuk the second year outside the crisis. 
It appears that sukuk issuance tends to hamper operating performance whereas bond issuance 
does not exert any impact.  
We also investigate the impact of sukuk issuance on free cash-flows. These results are 
displayed in Table 8. Sukuk issuance significantly increases free cash-flows of the firm the 
second and third year following an issuance. Moreover, it also fosters the pace of free cash-
flows’ retention over the three year. Once more, these results hold for the period outside the 
financial crisis.  
The difference of sukuk and bond issuances impact on free cash-flow also proves to be 
significantly positive on the full sample. Sukuk issuance appears to increase cash-flows’ 
retention whereas bond issuance does not impact free cash-flows.  
Thus our main conclusion is that sukuk issuance hampers the operating performance of 
the issuer and generates retention of free cash-flows. Hypothesis 2 according to which it 
should deteriorate this performance is supported. Hypothesis 4 assuming that sukuk issuance 
generates retention of free cash flows by the issuer is also accepted.  
 
5.4 Medium-term stock market reaction 
 
To shed light on the impact of sukuk issuance on the medium-term stock performance, 
we use the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. This method is based on the measurement of the 
stock return of a firm to which we subtract the return of the market portfolio over a certain 
period. We consider three observation periods, namely one, two, and three years after the 
announcement. 
Table 9 displays the medium-term abnormal returns. We observe significantly 
negative returns for sukuk issuers and significantly positive returns for bond issuers. More 
precisely, the abnormal return for a bond issue is positive and significant during the three 
years following the issue. For a sukuk, the abnormal return is negative on the second and third 
years. The difference in medium-term abnormal returns between sukuk and bonds appears to 
be significant over the whole period. The underperformance of sukuk issuers lasts for the three 
years following the issuance. Thus, the medium-term reaction of stock markets tends to be 
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similar to the short-term one: sukuk issuance generates a detrimental market response and 
firms perform worse than their counterparts for both horizons. 
We interpret this result by the fact that sukuk issuers have a better operating 
performance but lowering over time, due to sukuk issuance. On the contrary, their greater 
operating performance the year preceding the issuance is already incorporated in their stock 
price. Hence, sukuk issuers have a negative stock market performance the years following the 
issuance. 
 
We extend the analysis of medium-term abnormal returns by considering separately 
issuances taking place before and during the financial crisis. We observe that the results in 
difference are essentially the same outside and during the financial crisis.  
A striking result is that the abnormal returns comparing to the market index are no 
longer significant for sukuk issuers during the financial crisis. We interpret it as the 
consequence of the strong decline of the index during the financial crisis. The difference 
between both issuers is however much higher than during the rest of the period, since bond 
issuers substantially outperform the index during the crisis. This finding is robust, as we 
observe it for the mean and for the median, and it persists for all three years of study. 
This negative reaction suggests that stock market investors sanction Islamic financial 
whatever the period: they dislike it in normal time and prefer bond issuers during the financial 
crisis. This behavior may be driven by the peculiarity of these instruments.  
These results are of particular interest for the debate on the resilience of Islamic 
finance during the financial crisis. Ho et al. (2014) finds evidence in favor of better resilience 
of Islamic finance during that period. This study is based on Islamic indices which have the 
key feature of including companies with low indebtedness. As a consequence, this dimension 
makes them more resilient in period of financial difficulties. However the majority of these 
companies do not participate actively to Islamic finance. The fact to belong to an Islamic 
index does not require some specific efforts of companies. In opposition, our study uses a 
sample of companies which have made a financial decision specifically Islamic by issuing 
sukuk. These companies have seen their stock returns shrinking with the crisis significantly 
more than the bond-issuing companies. Our results then complete those from Girard and 
Kabir Hassan (2008) who do not find any significant difference between Islamic indices and 
conventional indices. 
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We complete our univariate analysis with regressions of medium-term abnormal 
returns to check the robustness of our findings. The results are reported in Table 10. We 
obtain the same conclusions than for the univariate analysis. We find that the decision to issue 
sukuk does exert a significant negative impact on the returns the second and third years over 
the full period and outside the financial crisis. Hence, sukuk issuance proves to be detrimental 
to firm’s stock performance, even when firm’s and issuance’s characteristics are taken into 
account.  
The study of medium-term abnormal returns then provides support to the view that the 
medium-term stock market reaction to sukuk issuance is negative relative to bond issuance. 
Thus we find evidence to support Hypothesis 5 according to which sukuk issuers are lower 
medium-term abnormal returns than bond issuers. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we examine how sukuk issuance influences firm performance. We consider 
the impact on stock market and operating performances to provide a broad perspective of the 
effects of issuing sukuk. 
We obtain several findings. First, we find that sukuk issuance generates a negative stock 
market reaction. We observe this conclusion for both the short-term and the medium-term 
stock market reaction. This result is consistent with the negative short-term market response 
found by Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill (2013), but completes it for the medium-term 
horizon.  
Second, we find that sukuk are issued by more profitable firms. However this better 
financial situation cannot be the result of the sukuk issue. Sukuk issuers are more profitable 
before the issue while the issuance lowers their operating performance. We also observe that 
sukuk issuers do not hold excessive free cash-flow before the issue but that sukuk issuance 
leads to retention of free cash-flows by the firm. Why would such firms take then the risk to 
issue sukuk and not to opt for bond to signal their quality and avoid bad performance? An 
interpretation is that slowdown companies without new outperforming investment projects 
head toward sukuk. The reason can be the oversubscription of these Islamic instruments, and 
the use of special purpose vehicle which does not directly hamper issuer’s balance sheet if the 
project turns to be defective. An additional interpretation is the role of sukuk structuring 
which diminishes profitability of projects by enhancing costs and moral hazard through 
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retention of free cash-flows. In either case sukuk is a bad signal: it signals losing speed firms, 
with moral hazard issues and/or flawed projects or future flawed projects. 
From a positive perspective, we contribute to have a better understanding of the reasons 
of the negative stock market reaction following sukuk issuance observed in the literature 
(Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill, 2013). Our findings support the view that adverse 
selection does not take place at the firm level but at the investment project level. Namely 
sukuk are issued by losing speed firms with less profitable investment projects. These firms 
might hope that their positive financial reputation will cover this peculiar choice of debt. 
Thus, issuing a sukuk does signal this specific type of firm. Moreover, issuing sukuk directly 
hampers firm performance and increases agency problems. These effects can be attributed to 
the peculiar features of these instruments. All in all, our findings contribute to understand the 
implications of sukuk issuance and then of the expansion of sukuk markets. 
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Table 1 
Sample distribution of issuances by industry and by year 
 
The table gives the composition of the sample by industry and by year.  
 
 
Bonds Sukuk 
Years   
2002 3 2 
2003 8 5 
2004 47 11 
2005 70 22 
2006 79 42 
2007 99 37 
2008 90 23 
2009 143 9 
2010 106 13 
   Sectors 
  Basic Materials 29 15 
Communications 18 0 
Consumer, Cyclical 62 43 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 116 8 
Diversified 30 3 
Energy 4 0 
Financial 231 45 
Industrial 133 47 
Utilities 22 3 
   
Total 645 164 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics by issue type 
 
The table provides the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of issuances in the sample. Amount issued 
is in USD, issue price and coupon are in percent of the nominal, and maturity is in years. If the issuance includes several 
tranches, the amounts have been aggregated and the issue price, coupon and maturity have been aggregated with each tranche 
weighted by the amount of the tranche to the amount of the issue. The stars indicate significant differences for means (ttest) 
and medians (Kruskall-Wallis test) of the variables by issue type, at the *10%, **5% or ***1% level.  
 
  N Mean Median Standard Dev Minimum Maximum 
Sukuk issuances 
 
          
Amount issued 164 26,700,000 7,406,357** 62,200,000 789,473.7 594,000,000 
Issue price 94 97.697 98.984 9.559 6.802 100 
Coupon 164 1.515*** 0*** 2.618 0 8.805 
Maturity 164 2.172*** 0.499*** 3.705 0.068 22.014 
       
Bond issuances 
      Amount issued 645 28,100,000 11,500,000** 63,400,000 293,599.5 718,000,000 
Issue price 274 98.443 99.118 6.443 26.316 100 
Coupon 645 0.578*** 0*** 1.677 0 7.7 
Maturity 645 0.83*** 0.249*** 1.959 0.077 17.55 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics by issuer 
 
The table sums up the issuer characteristics the year preceding the issue, depending on the security it issued. The sample 
encompasses 114 unique issuers, 47 issued sukuk and 67 issued bonds (no overlapping). Variables are in million USD with 
the exception of ratios in percentage and maturity in years. For these two last variables, each issue has been weighted by its 
amount. Data are spawning from 2001 to 2009 (one year before the issue). The stars indicate significant differences for 
means (ttest) and medians (Kruskall-Wallis test) of the variables by issue type, at the *10%, **5% or ***1% level. 
 
 
N Mean Median Standard Dev Minimum Maximum 
Bonds Issuers  
 
      
  Sales  168 506.668 193.569*** 636.715 3.573 3781.562 
Market capitalization 165 0.66*** 0.768*** 0.249 0.067 0.94 
Fixed Assets to Total Assets  166 0.385 0.407 0.257 0.004 0.918 
Debt ratio  164 32.534 31.302 17.159 0.511 88.5 
Current ratio  132 1.422** 1.237*** 0.884 0.038 4.512 
Altman Z-Score  132 1.528 1.705 3.25 -8.671 14.798 
Ebitda to Total Assets  (%) 136 7.837 7.461** 7.388 -13.727 52.556 
Return on assets  (%) 160 2.393** 1.601*** 8.126 -16.898 55.323 
FCF on assets  167 0.005*** 0.003* 0.095 -0.268 0.582 
Amount Issued per Year 174 142*** 65.8*** 208 0.310 1750 
Mean Maturity per Year 174 2.69 0.634 3.429 0.067 17.55 
       Sukuk Issuers 
      Sales  110 508.712 82.968*** 1456.919 3.793 10281.84 
Market capitalization 110 0.811*** 0.844*** 0.123 0.075 0.988 
Fixed Assets to Total Assets  110 0.409 0.407 0.225 0.005 0.927 
Debt ratio  108 33.561 32.878 16.738 0.2 98.092 
Current ratio  108 1.754** 1.514*** 1.255 0.108 8.432 
Altman Z-Score  110 1.654 1.949 2.63 -7.28 11.681 
Ebitda to Total Assets  (%) 107 8.928 8.74** 4.97 -2.723 20.675 
Return on assets  (%) 107 4.35** 4.467*** 4.981 -14.013 19.482 
FCF on assets  109 -0.028*** -0.012* 0.107 -0.365 0.264 
Amount Issued per Year 112 64.3*** 26.2*** 108 2.639296 797 
Mean Maturity per Year 112 3.292 1.122 4.321 0.079 22.014 
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Table 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns 
 
The table presents the cumulative abnormal returns zero to five days surrounding the issue event. The sample has been 
divided between issues that occurred outside and during the financial crisis. The CARs are displayed in points of percentage. 
Ttest has been generated to test the significance of means. Aburthnott non-parametric sign-test for medians and Kruskall-
Wallis non parametric test for differences of medians have been calculated. *, ** or *** indicate significance of the variables 
at the 10%, 5% or 1% confidence level. 
 
Windows Issue Type N CAR Mean SCAR Mean CAR Median 
Full Sample   
    [0,0] Sukuk 164 -0.039 -0.01 -0.04 
 
Bond 645 0.24** 0.082* 0 
 
Difference 809 -0.28 -0.092 -0.038 
[-1,1] Sukuk 164 -0.552* -0.078 -0.56** 
 
Bond 645 0.265 0.047 0 
 
Difference 809 -0.816** -0.124 -0.563* 
[-2,2] Sukuk 164 -0.721* -0.106 -0.55 
 
Bond 645 0.09 0.011 0 
 
Difference 809 -0.811 -0.118 -0.115 
      Outside the financial crisis 
   [0,0] Sukuk 132 -0.004 -0.017 -0.06 
 
Bond 412 0.268** 0.098* 0 
 
Difference 544 -0.272 -0.115 -0.06 
[-1,1] Sukuk 132 -0.39 -0.039 -0.65* 
 
Bond 412 0.33* 0.048 0 
 
Difference 544 -0.721* -0.086 -0.649* 
[-2,2] Sukuk 132 -0.656 -0.105 -0.51 
 
Bond 412 0.214 0.02 0.01 
 
Difference 544 -0.869* -0.125 -0.108 
      During the financial crisis 
    [0,0] Sukuk 32 -0.186 0.022 0 
 
Bond 233 0.191 0.055 0 
 
Difference 265 -0.377 -0.033 0 
[-1,1] Sukuk 32 -1.216 -0.239 -0.32 
 
Bond 233 0.149 0.045 -0.08 
 
Difference 265 -1.365 -0.284 -0.239 
[-2,2] Sukuk 32 -0.991 -0.111 -0.98 
 
Bond 233 -0.128 -0.003 -0.16 
  Difference 265 -0.863 -0.108 -0.156 
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Table 5 
Regression of cumulative abnormal returns 
 
The table presents the estimations of OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Dummy variables for sector 
and year of issuance are also included but not reported. Standard deviations are clustered at the issuer level. The sample is 
divided between issues that occurred outside and during the financial crisis. Student’s statistic is displayed in brackets. ***, 
**, and * denote coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
   CAR[-1,1]  CAR[-2,2] 
 
 
Full Sample 
 
Outside Crisis 
  During Crisis  Full 
 Sample 
 Outside 
 Crisis 
 During 
 Crisis 
Sukuk  -0.55**  -0.36   -1.19  -0.68**  -0.50  -0.19 
 
 (-2.35)  (-1.39)   (-1.44)  (-2.05)  (-1.15)  (-0.18) 
Amount issued  -0.006*  -0.007*   -0.004  -0.006**  -0.004  -0.008** 
 
 (-1.98)  (-1.95)   (-0.99)  (-2.18)  (-0.87)  (-2.32) 
Coupon  -0.09  0.01   -0.43  -0.18  -0.10  -0.18 
 
 (-0.98)  (0.12)   (-0.66)  (-1.66)  (-0.68)  (-0.32) 
Maturity  0.04  0.01   0.13  0.12*  0.08  0.08 
 
 (0.62)  (0.18)   (0.31)  (1.83)  (1.12)  (0.22) 
Sales (log)  -0.04  0.17   -0.35  -0.03  0.02  -0.32 
 
 (-0.32)  (1.44)   (-0.57)  (-0.22)  (0.13)  (-0.55) 
Market capitalization  1.32  4.61**   -2.93  -1.02  0.60  1.31 
 
 (0.49)  (2.25)   (-0.21)  (-0.37)  (0.21)  (0.09) 
Debt ratio  -0.00  -0.01   0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.03 
 
 (-0.23)  (-0.31)   (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.36)  (-0.64) 
Current ratio  -0.04  -0.31   1.10  0.12  -0.06  0.74 
 
 (-0.24)  (-1.60)   (0.85)  (0.59)  (-0.27)  (0.60) 
Altman Z score  0.19***  0.23***   0.37**  0.23**  0.28*  0.18 
 
 (3.68)  (3.03)   (2.21)  (2.03)  (1.93)  (1.04) 
Constant  1.02  -2.02   2.46  4.20*  3.84  -1.01 
 
 (0.42)  (-0.91)   (0.24)  (1.73)  (1.40)  (-0.10) 
              
Sectors Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Years Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  697  490   207  697  490  207 
Nb of Issuers (clusters)  65  61   22  65  61  22 
R²  0.02  0.05   0.03  0.02  0.04  0.02 
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Table 6 
Abnormal Operating Performance 
 
The table presents the means and medians of cumulated (Cltd) abnormal operating performance proxied by three different 
performance indicators. The sample has been divided between issues that occurred outside and during the financial crisis. 
Two types of expectancy calculations are displayed. Wilcoxon non-parametric test has been used to test significance of 
medians. *, ** or *** indicate significance of the variables at the 10%, 5% or 1% confidence level. 
 
  Full Sample  Outside Crisis  Crisis 
 
N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Ebitda           
Standard Expectancy                   
N-1 96 0.725 0.025  71 1.215 1.467  25 -0.665 -1.429 
Current 101 1.257* 0.981  76 1.387 0.967  25 0.859 1.013 
Cltd N+1 100 1.685 2.913  76 1.753 2.65  24 1.468 3.026 
Cltd N+2 93 1.849 1.227  69 1.331 0.192  24 3.338 3.745 
Cltd N+3 87 0.872 1.461  63 -0.307 -3.737  24 3.969 2.784 
Variation Expectancy 
  
 
   
 
   Current 96 0.462 0.354  71 0.088 0.082  25 1.523* 2.185 
Cltd N+1 95 -0.37 -0.004  71 -1.08 -1.05  24 1.731 1.304 
Cltd N+2 88 -0.477 -0.855  64 -1.674* -1.34  24 2.714* 3.487 
Cltd N+3 84 -1.657* -1.708  60 -2.91** -2.753**  24 1.475 2.809 
      
ROA            
Standard Expectancy 
  
 
   
 
   N-1 98 1.672* 1.868**  75 1.69 2.421**  23 1.614* 1.22 
Current 101 0.859 1.22***  76 0.485 1.129*  25 1.997* 2.354 
Cltd N+1 99 2.957* 4.141***  75 2.44 3.168**  24 4.571** 4.611* 
Cltd N+2 89 4.756** 6.646***  65 3.865 5.955**  24 7.169** 8.519* 
Cltd N+3 84 5.627* 8.753**  60 4.585 8.564*  24 8.23* 11.244 
Variation Expectancy 
  
 
   
 
   Current 98 -1.002 -0.244  75 -1.39 -0.506  23 0.26 0.399 
Cltd N+1 96 0.145 0.095  74 -0.038 -0.426  22 0.759 1.868 
Cltd N+2 86 -1.549* -0.551  64 -2.341** -2.289**  22 0.756 2.315 
Cltd N+3 81 -1.447 0.242  59 -1.643 -0.312  22 -0.922 0.873 
      
FCF            
Standard Expectancy 
  
 
   
 
   N-1 100 -0.017 -0.007  75 -0.024 -0.007  25 0.003 0.003 
Current 105 -0.02* -0.002  80 -0.024* -0.005  25 -0.005 -0.002 
Cltd N+1 105 -0.028 0.004  80 -0.036 0.005  25 -0.005 -0.019 
Cltd N+2 96 -0.015 0.032  72 -0.028 0.021  24 0.026 0.051 
Cltd N+3 93 -0.015 0.043*  69 -0.045 0.034  24 0.07* 0.061* 
Variation Expectancy 
  
 
   
 
   Current 100 -0.007 -0.022  75 -0.006 -0.007  25 -0.008 -0.036 
Cltd N+1 100 0.008 0.018  75 0.012 0.021  25 -0.004 0.004 
Cltd N+2 91 0.025* 0.02  67 0.029* 0.022  24 0.016 0.011 
Cltd N+3 90 0.021 0.027  66 0.015 0.013  24 0.037 0.036 
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Table 7 
Regression of performance indicators 
 
The table presents the estimations of panel regressions with random effects on Ebitda and RoA forwarded from one to three 
years after the issuance and on the variation from the year of the issuance to the third year. The set of control variables 
includes Sales (log), Market capitalization, Leverage, Current ratio, Altman Z score, Total Amount Issued, and Mean 
Maturity. Dummy variables for sector and year of issuance are also included. Standard deviations are clustered at the issuer 
level. Student’s statistic is displayed in brackets and Chi² for the difference in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote 
coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
  Ebitda   RoA 
  N+1 N+2 N+3 Variation   N+1 N+2 N+3 Variation 
Full Sample 
         Sukuk 2.01 1.62 0.21 -0.99 
 
-0.16 -1.27 -2.52** -1.19 
 
(0.93) (0.78) (0.08) (-0.53) 
 
(-0.18) (-1.54) (-2.07) (-0.82) 
Bond 2.75 2.14 1.66 0.87 
 
-0.48 -0.32 -1.01 -0.65 
 
(1.62) (1.46) (1.03) (0.74) 
 
(-0.63) (-0.40) (-1.37) (-0.73) 
Constant 6.37 5.71 1.99 -0.38 
 
-8.45* -8.42* -7.49 0.16 
 
(0.51) (0.43) (0.15) (-0.23) 
 
(-1.79) (-1.72) (-1.44) (0.18) 
Sukuk-Bond -0.73 -0.52 -1.45 -1.86 
 
0.32 -0.96 -1.51 -0.53 
 
[0.26] [0.09] [0.49] [1.09] 
 
[0.16] [1.22] [1.68] [0.13] 
N 1166 1094 1021 928 
 
1143 1074 1001 902 
Overall R² 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.41 
 
0.36 0.36 0.37 0.22 
Chi² 50.74 51.59 65.87 46.24 
 
449.18 421.24 348.96 787.41 
          Outside the financial crisis 
       Sukuk 0.07 -1.05 1.26 -0.14 
 
0.01 -1.67 -2.94** -1.04 
 
(0.06) (-0.86) (0.38) (-0.06) 
 
(0.01) (-1.59) (-2.03) (-0.54) 
Bond 0.53 0.91 1.44 1.25 
 
-0.88 -0.41 -1.24 -0.64 
 
(0.66) (1.10) (0.91) (0.89) 
 
(-1.12) (-0.53) (-1.56) (-0.55) 
Constant -4.03 -4.51 16.01 2.71 
 
-7.15 -8.20 -7.56 0.60 
 
(-0.71) (-0.78) (0.89) (0.97) 
 
(-1.49) (-1.53) (-1.33) (0.39) 
Sukuk-Bond -0.46 -1.96* -0.18 -1.39 
 
0.89 -1.27 -1.70 -0.40 
 
[0.27] [3.11] [0.00] [0.34] 
 
[0.75] [1.86] [1.55] [0.04] 
N 995 929 865 776 
 
974 911 846 749 
Overall R² 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.44 
 
0.34 0.34 0.34 0.22 
Chi² 188.47 178.06 59.60 36.66 
 
267.59 284.48 306.57 966.81 
          During the financial crisis 
        Sukuk 0.44 1.92 -1.91 -2.10 
 
-0.73 0.28 -0.78 -1.04 
 
(0.10) (0.84) (-0.98) (-0.99) 
 
(-0.45) (0.24) (-0.50) (-0.54) 
Bond -3.46 -2.61 0.93 -0.92 
 
0.94 0.00 -1.26 -1.07 
 
(-1.06) (-0.64) (0.49) (-0.60) 
 
(0.82) (0.00) (-0.77) (-0.63) 
Constant -36.26 -56.11 -6.80 -3.43 
 
-18.37** -5.79 -8.47 5.91* 
 
(-1.53) (-1.34) (-1.19) (-0.97) 
 
(-2.13) (-1.55) (-1.52) (1.88) 
Sukuk-Bond 3.89 4.53 -2.85 -1.18 
 
-1.66 0.28 0.48 0.03 
 
[0.49] [0.65] [1.46] [0.31] 
 
[0.69] [0.02] [0.06] [0.00] 
N 171 165 156 152 
 
169 163 155 153 
Overall R² 0.84 0.78 0.71 0.20 
 
0.58 0.69 0.67 0.29 
Chi² 456 31.19 218.45 199.11 
 
4016.06 1486.24 185.72 101.89 
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Table 8 
Regression of free cash-flows indicator 
 
 
The table presents the estimations of panel regressions with random effects on free cash-flows forwaded from one to three 
years after the issuance and on the variation from the third year to the year of the issuance. The set of control variables 
includes Sales (log), Market capitalization, Leverage, Current ratio, Altman Z score, Amount Issued and Maturity.  Dummy 
variables for sector and year of issuance are also included. Standard deviations are clustered at the issuer level. Student’s 
statistic is displayed in brackets and Chi² for the difference in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 
FCF 
 
N+1 N+2 N+3 Variation 
Full Sample     
Sukuk 0.003 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 
 
(0.33) (2.95) (3.28) (3.44) 
Bond 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(1.21) (1.00) (0.88) (0.87) 
Constant 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 -0.01 
 
(1.74) (1.79) (1.42) (-0.56) 
Sukuk-Bond -0.01 0.02* 0.02* 0.04** 
 
[0.54] [3.09] [3.56] [5.40] 
N 1168 1097 1024 932 
Overall R² 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.11 
     Outside the financial crisis 
    Sukuk 0.002 0.02** 0.03** 0.06*** 
 
(0.14) (2.29) (2.13) (3.31) 
Bond 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02* 
 
(0.90) (0.82) (1.02) (1.84) 
Constant 0.02 0.03 0.09** 0.01 
 
(0.46) (0.77) (2.14) (0.67) 
Sukuk-Bond -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04** 
 
[0.30] [2.17] [1.55] [4.45] 
N 996 932 868 778 
Overall R² 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.13 
     During the financial crisis 
    Sukuk -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 
(-1.13) (0.53) (0.78) (-0.19) 
Bond -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
 
(-1.09) (-0.07) (-0.50) (-1.03) 
Constant -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 
 
(-0.88) (-0.32) (-0.46) (0.26) 
Sukuk-Bond -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 
[0.23] [0.24] [0.96] [0.37] 
N 172 165 156 154 
Overall R² 0.56 0.63 0.39 0.15 
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Table 9 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
The table presents the buy and hold abnormal returns one to three years after the issuance event. The sample has been divided 
between issues that occurred outside and during the financial crisis. The BHARs are displayed in points of percentage. Ttest 
has been generated to test the significance of means. Aburthnott non-parametric sign-test for medians and Kruskall-Wallis 
non parametric test for differences of medians have been calculated. *, ** or *** indicate significance of the variables at the 
10%, 5% or 1% confidence level. 
 
Years Issue Type N Mean BHAR Median BHAR 
Full Sample 
    1 Sukuk 164 -0.19 -11.48*** 
 
Bond 645 13.6*** 10.14*** 
 
Difference 809 -13.79*** -21.62*** 
2 Sukuk 164 -14.1*** -22.67*** 
 
Bond 645 34.04*** 21.86*** 
 
Difference 809 -48.13*** -44.53*** 
3 Sukuk 164 -20.11*** -35.02*** 
 
Bond 645 66.86*** 42.29*** 
 
Difference 809 -86.97*** -77.31*** 
     Outside the financial crisis 
  1 Sukuk 132 -1.09 -13.34*** 
 
Bond 412 6.59*** 3.45 
 
Difference 544 -7.68 -16.79*** 
2 Sukuk 132 -17.4*** -26.97*** 
 
Bond 412 19.32*** 17.3*** 
 
Difference 544 -36.72*** -44.27*** 
3 Sukuk 132 -27.93*** -39.39*** 
 
Bond 412 57.13*** 38.33*** 
 
Difference 544 -85.07*** -77.71*** 
     During the financial crisis 
   1 Sukuk 32 3.52 -3.62 
 
Bond 233 26*** 21.51*** 
 
Difference 265 -22.47** -25.13*** 
2 Sukuk 32 -0.47 -9.66 
 
Bond 233 60.06*** 51.98*** 
 
Difference 265 -60.53*** -61.65*** 
3 Sukuk 32 12.18 5.64 
 
Bond 233 84.07*** 58.37*** 
  Difference 265 -71.89*** -52.73*** 
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Table 10 
Regression of buy and hold abnormal returns 
 
The table presents the estimations of OLS regressions of BHARs. We only report the key independent variable Sukuk in the 
table. The set of control variables includes Sales (log), Market capitalization, Leverage, Current ratio, Altman Z score, 
Amount Issued, Coupon and Maturity . Dummy variables for sector and year of issuance are also included. Standard 
deviations are clustered at the issuer level. The sample is divided between issues that occurred outside or during the financial 
crisis. Student’s statistic is displayed in brackets. ***, **, and * denote coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level. 
 
BHAR 
Years 1 2 3 
Full Sample       
Sukuk -11.15 -39.87*** -72.82*** 
 
(-1.53) (-3.71) (-3.75) 
    Constant -124.51 -95.72 -283.93** 
 
(-1.66) (-1.46) (-2.09) 
    Firm Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Issuance Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Years Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 700 690 678 
Nb of Issuers (clusters) 65 63 63 
R² 0.30 0.52 0.63 
    
 
BHAR 
 
BHAR 
Years 1 2 3   1 2 3 
 
 Outside Financial Crisis 
 
During Financial Crisis 
Sukuk -6.74 -36.44*** -75.22*** 
 
-9.91 29.16 74.16 
 
(-0.83) (-3.27) (-4.00) 
 
(-0.53) (0.56) (0.68) 
        Constant -138.20 -154.78** -298.25*** 
 
-62.62 262.53 289.92 
 
(-1.45) (-2.50) (-2.96) 
 
(-0.75) (1.44) (1.13) 
        Firm variables Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Issuance Variables Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Years Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 487 478 466 
 
213 212 212 
Nb of Issuers (clusters) 61 60 60 
 
22 21 21 
R² 0.25 0.40 0.58 
 
0.53 0.77 0.82 
 
